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Abstract1 
 
Since its creation in 1999, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) has 
evolved rapidly. This new policy area presented Sweden, a once neutral state, with a 
challenge to its security policy tradition. In responding to this new security context, 
Sweden was initially reluctant about the ESDP but has today become one of its 
staunchest supporters and active members.  
 
By examining Sweden’s participation in the ESDP since its inception, the paper seeks 
to answer what impact Sweden has had on the ESDP, but also to what extent the 
ESDP has influenced Swedish security policy. Furthermore, the paper seeks to shed 
light on why Sweden has become so active and supportive of the ESDP despite the 
initial reluctance. 
 
Applying the multidimensional model of Europeanisation put forward by Reuben 
Wong and carried out primarily through conducting interviews with key officials, the 
paper argues that Sweden has embarked on a rather spectacular journey, from be-
ing a sceptical and hesitant participant to being one of its main driving forces. While 
the ESDP has had a major influence on Sweden’s security policy and engendered 
several changes and adaptations at the domestic level, the paper, however, also 
argues that Sweden has had a major impact on shaping the current character of 
the ESDP. As for the reasons behind Swedish activism in the ESDP, it is argued that it 
was the opportunity to influence the development of the ESDP, including pushing it 
to reflect Swedish interests, that has been the main driving force. Hence, the paper 
points to an interwoven relation between European and domestic levels that con-
firms the bi-directional character of the process of Europeanisation.  
 
 
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank C. D’Aniello for her assistance while writing his M.A. thesis, which this paper builds on. 
A special thank also goes to M. Strömvik who encouraged research into this topic in the first place and who gave 
precious advice along the process. Finally, thanks also go to all those officials who agreed to be interviewed.  
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1. Introduction: Europeanising Swedish Security Policy 
 
‘If you want to do something in the [area of] the ESDP […], it needs to fit into a trian-
gle of France, the UK and Sweden’2. 
 
To many, not just Swedes, the above remark may appear surprising. At first sight, it 
seems rather doubtful that a relatively small member state of the European Union 
(EU), and moreover one that is not a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisa-
tion (NATO), would be considered to be in the same league as two of the largest 
and most powerful member states of the EU. This may seem even more remarkable 
as Sweden, which joined the EU only in 1995, was in the late 1990s highly sceptical 
towards the creation of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), even indi-
cating that it would be prepared to block it. Following the decision by the Cologne 
European Council in June 1999 to launch the ESDP, the Swedish government distin-
guished itself from other EU member states by declaring that the new policy was to 
mainly focus on ‘minesweeping, police training and the interpretation of satellite im-
ages’3. 
Despite this narrow appreciation of the coverage of the new policy, the record 
since paints a different picture. Sweden has contributed with personnel to all ESDP 
operations to date, including the military engagements. In 2003, it was the only other 
EU member state to join France in deploying combat forces to Operation Artemis in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)4. In 2004, Sweden announced that it 
would not only take part in, but also lead one of the EU Battle Groups (EUBG). Swe-
den contributes the lion share (2,300 out of 2,800 troops5) to the Nordic Battle Group 
(NBG), on standby mode since 1 January 2008. From having viewed ESDP initially with 
great scepticism and reluctance, Sweden has today become one of its most active 
participants. There seems thus to be a clear indication of a policy shift since 1999 
which raises questions as regards the relation between Sweden and the ESDP. 
Since its creation in the late 1990s, the ESDP has evolved with the ‘speed of light’, 
as Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), has put it. This is striking, in particular viewed against the incremental 
steps taken since the failure of the European Defence Community in the 1950s. Fur-
thermore, the development is even more remarkable given that security and de-
fence policy is at the core of national sovereignty and thus an area that many would 
have considered the least likely to be subject to such rapid progress6. Since the first 
ESDP operation was launched in 2003, there have been some twenty missions and in 
February 2008, the EU launched its largest, and possibly most challenging, civilian 
mission hitherto in Kosovo.  
This new policy area presented Sweden, a longstanding neutral state, with a 
challenge to its security policy tradition. It had to consider what role to play in 
                                                 
2 Interview #2.  
3 N. Sandberg, ’Jag lyssnade på…’, Dagens Nyheter, 06.06.1999. 
4 M. Strömvik, To Act as a Union, Lund, Department of Political Science, Lund University, 2005, p. 228. 
5 The NBG also includes troops from Finland (200), Norway (150), Ireland (80) and Estonia (50). 
6 J. Solana, ‘Preface’, in N. Gnesotto (ed.), EU Security and Defence Policy, Paris, EU-ISS, 2004, p. 5. 
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Europe’s evolving security order and how to respond to the new security context. At 
the time of accession, some authors argued that the Swedish security policy tradition 
of non-alignment would make it impossible for Sweden to claim a place at the core 
of the EU and that Sweden lacked a strong commitment to the ESDP. Furthermore, 
several scholars have argued that Swedish foreign policy today is more the EU’s than 
its own7. This interpretation is not without merit. Certainly, the ESDP is likely to have 
had an impact on Sweden’s security and defence policy. However, it fails to explain 
why Sweden has played such an active role in the ESDP. Furthermore, it would be 
quite remarkable if activism had not translated into some form of influence. This per-
spective thus neglects the possible impact that Sweden has had on the ESDP and 
the role Sweden has played in the development of the ESDP. Hence, it seems neces-
sary to search for alternative approaches to better understand Sweden and the de-
velopment of the ESDP. 
 
Dimensions of Europeanisation 
The concept of ‘Europeanisation’ has recently started being applied to the study of 
national foreign policies within the context of Europe, including the impact of the 
CFSP8. According to Reuben Wong, Europeanisation under the CFSP can be under-
stood as ‘a process of foreign policy convergence’ being a ‘dependent variable 
contingent on the ideas and directives emanating from actors […] in Brussels, as well 
as policy ideas and actions from member state capitals’9. With this definition, Euro-
peanisation becomes a concept encompassing both the ‘process of change mani-
fested as policy convergence (both top-down and sideways) as well as national 
policies amplified as EU policy (bottom-up projection)’10. In the relationship between 
a member state’s foreign policy and the CFSP, Europeanisation is thus understood as 
a process with at least two directions. 
The first dimension is a top-down process of national adaptation and policy con-
vergence (‘downloading’) that focuses on the increasing influence of the EU level on 
national structures and procedures and the adaptation of member states. Initially, 
Europeanisation was considered to be a concept to describe the convergence of 
national policy-making styles and content that EU membership leads to (sometimes 
also referred to as ‘Brusselsisation’)11. The state is thus perceived largely as reactive, 
underlining the dilution of the ‘national’ in favour of the ‘European’, a transformation 
that usually translates as an ‘incremental process of adjustment and adaptation re-
orienting member states’ politics and policies towards the EU’12. This process of policy 
convergence is the one that so far has received most attention by scholars and that 
is predominantly used in the academic literature on Europeanisation. Indeed, most 
                                                 
7 Cf. e.g. T. Tiilikainen, ‘The Nordic countries and the EU-NATO relationship’, in A. Bailes, G. Herolf & B. Sundelius (eds.), 
The Nordic Countries and the ESDP, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, and P. Rieker, Europeanization of National 
Security Identity, London, Routledge, 2006, p. 2f, 63. 
8 R. Wong, ‘Foreign Policy’, in P. Graziano & M. Vink (eds.), Europeanization, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 
322ff. 
9 Ibid., p. 322. 
10 Ibid. 
11 R. Wong, ‘The Europeanization of Foreign Policy’, in C. Hill & M. Smith (eds.), International Relations and the EU, Ox-
ford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 145.  
12 Ibid.  
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works tend to view the ESDP as a new security context to which member states have 
had to adapt and react without much possibility to influence its development13.  
The second dimension is a bottom-up process where states are the primary actors 
and agents of change rather than mere passive subjects. It emphasises the roles 
played by the member states themselves. Europeanisation is thus seen as a process 
where member states use the EU as an instrument to export domestic policies, mod-
els, preferences, ideas and details to the EU level14. This is perhaps the most interest-
ing dimension given that it is expected that only ‘states which command large re-
sources, strong domestic pressure or dogged commitment’ are able to change or 
forge a certain EU policy15. Following this concept, the larger EU member states use 
the European level to further their national interests and increase their international 
influence. However, as Wong writes, sometimes the EU also gives ‘small states the 
necessary institutional resources […] to project their own interests as European inter-
ests’16 though this has received much less scholarly attention to date. In sum, it seems 
that it is only by combining these two dimensions of Europeanisation that we can ac-
tually better apprehend the complex relationship between the ESDP and member 
states’ foreign policies.  
The Europeanisation of Swedish security policy triggers interest in three key ques-
tions: To what extent has the ESDP influenced Swedish security policy? What impact 
has Sweden had on the ESDP? Why has Sweden become so active and supportive 
of the ESDP? The first question relates to the possible impact of the ESDP on Swedish 
security policy in terms of procedures and substance, the dimension that Wong calls 
‘downloading’. The second question touches upon the implications for the ESDP of 
the Swedish commitment, which corresponds to the ‘uploading’ dimension of Wong. 
This is particularly relevant as there is reason to believe in our case that Sweden has 
exerted influence on parts of the institutional and political features of the ESDP. To-
gether the two first questions aim to examine the extent of the redefinition of Swedish 
security policy in response to the CFSP, and in particular the ESDP, but also the pro-
jection of Swedish interests as European. The third question flows from the other two 
and focuses on the motives behind the Swedish participation in the ESDP, but also on 
possible explanations as to the policy shift that seems to have taken place. Address-
ing these three questions, Wong’s dimensions of Europeanisation will serve as an ana-
lytical framework and research model for this paper. For each dimension, there are a 
number of indicators, set out in Table 1, which will guide the study. 
 
                                                 
13 N. Græger, H. Larsen & H. Ojanen, The ESDP and the Nordic countries, Helsinki, Ulkopoliittinen instituutti, 2002. 
14 Wong, op.cit., p. 137. 
15 Ibid., p. 150. 
16 Ibid., p. 147. 
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Table 1: Dimensions of Europeanisation in national foreign policy 
 
Aspects of Europeanisation  National foreign policy indicators 
 
I. Adaptation and policy convergence 
(‘downloading’) 
 
Harmonisation and transformation of a member 
state to the needs and requirements of EU mem-
bership 
 
a) Increasing salience of European political 
agenda 
b) Adherence to common objectives 
c) Common policy outputs taking priority over na-
tional domaines réservés 
d) Internalisation of EU norms and policy (‘EU-
isation’) 
II. National projection (‘uploading’) 
 
National foreign policy of a member state affects 
and contributes to the development of a common 
European foreign policy 
a) State attempts to increase national influence in 
the world 
b) State attempts to influence foreign policies of 
other member states 
c) State uses the EU as a cover/umbrella 
d) Externalisation of national foreign policy posi-
tions onto the EU level 
  Source: Adapted version from R. Wong, ‘Foreign Policy’, op.cit., p. 326. 
As the subject of Sweden’s involvement in the ESDP has so far generated little inter-
est, with the exception of a few works17, the paper has been carried out primarily 
through conducting interviews with key officials in Stockholm (the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Justice) and Brussels (the Perma-
nent Representation of Sweden to the EU) as well as in the EU institutions (the Council 
and the Commission)18. 
The paper first explores the journey from initial scepticism to overt enthusiasm in 
the ESDP that Sweden has embarked upon. The influence that Sweden has had on 
its development but also the impact of the ESDP on Swedish security policy will then 
be discussed. Finally, the underpinning reasons and motives of Swedish participation 
in the ESDP will be briefly examined and some conclusions will be drawn.  
 
 
2. A Journey from Scepticism to Enthusiasm 
 
The Bumpy Road to Cologne (1995–1999) 
For Sweden, the future security and defence dimension of the EU was highly prob-
lematic and in the early years, the Swedish government did not seem entirely con-
vinced of either the desirability or the necessity of such a development19. Indeed, 
Sweden was reluctant and wanted to stop progress towards an EU security and de-
fence policy20.  
Sweden’s starting point, shared by several other member states, was that crisis 
management should be clearly distinguished from a common defence, understood 
as territorial defence or mutual defence guarantees21. Sweden explicitly excluded 
mutual defence guarantees and the Finnish-Swedish initiative in 199622, proposing 
                                                 
17 E.g. Bailes, Herolf & Sundelius, op.cit., Rieker, op.cit., as well as several pieces written by Strömvik. 
18 The author is in this context indebted to M. Strömvik who helped identifying an initial list of potential interviewees. As 
regards possible interview bias, several interviewees were of Swedish nationality although associated with different 
institutions, bodies and agencies often in competition with each other.  
19 P. Jonson, The Development of the ESDP, Stockholm, FOI, 2006, p. 197ff. 
20 Interview #13. 
21 H. Ojanen, ‘Sweden and Finland’, in Græger et al., op.cit., p. 164. 
22 L. Hjelm-Wallén, Lena & T. Halonen, ’Svensk-finsk WEU-aktion’, Dagens Nyheter, 21.04.1996. 
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that the EU could undertake the ‘Petersberg tasks’, was an attempt to block progress 
towards a collective defence23. It should be viewed against a context where pro-
posals of a merger of the Western European Union (WEU) and the EU were being dis-
cussed and, as new EU members, Sweden and Finland were not in a position to 
block these but instead had to consider how to limit their development24. The result 
of the Finnish-Swedish proposal was that the ‘Petersberg tasks’ were transferred to 
the EU, but the WEU’s territorial defence mission stayed outside the treaties25. From 
the Swedish side, the inclusion of the ‘Petersberg tasks’ in the Amsterdam Treaty was 
perceived as a major diplomatic success and a form of demilitarisation of the EU’s 
security dimension26.  
The Swedish reaction to the Anglo-French St. Malo declaration in 1998 was thus 
lukewarm as it raised concerns as to whether Swedish military non-alignment might 
be endangered27. In November 1998, Sweden tried to stop – without actually veto-
ing it – the informal meeting of EU defence ministers in Vienna during the Austrian EU 
Presidency – a move which did not draw much sympathy from other EU member 
states28. At the Cologne European Council in June 1999, the issue of a WEU-EU 
merger was again on the table. Even though the Cologne European Council saw the 
birth of the ESDP, the idea of a collective defence guarantee again failed as the 
decision was taken to include ‘those functions of the WEU which will be necessary for 
the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks’29. The then 
Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson tried to marginalise the Presidency conclusions 
and told the Riksdag that the ESDP aimed at ‘mine clearance in Bosnia and the 
training of border guards in Macedonia and police officers in Albania’30. The Swedish 
government was thus still largely hesitant and reluctant. Foreign Minister Anna Lindh 
declared that a ‘clear dividing line between crisis management and territorial de-
fence should be upheld’31. At the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, dur-
ing the discussions about crisis management troops, Sweden and other like-minded 
member states managed to insert in the Presidency conclusions that the ESDP proc-
ess ‘does not imply the creation of a European army’32.  
However, the Swedish government’s reluctant approval of the ESDP and its cau-
tious remarks made in public should also be seen in the prism of the domestic politi-
cal scene. The government’s parliamentary basis depended on two eurosceptic par-
ties and there were internal divisions in the ruling Social Democratic Party itself on the 
development of the ESDP. The timing is also important as elections to the European 
Parliament were coming up in June 1999, thus coinciding with the Cologne Euro-
pean Council, which politicised the issue further. Indeed, a week before the elec-
tions, the former Swedish Defence Minister Thage G. Peterson attacked his col-
                                                 
23 Interview #3. 
24 Græger et al., op.cit., p. 16. 
25 Ojanen, op.cit., p. 165. 
26 Rieker, op.cit., p. 72 
27 Jonson, op.cit., p. 204. 
28 Jonson, op.cit., p. 65f. 
29 Cologne European Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, 03–04.061999, p. 35. 
30 D. Ljungberg, ’Frän riksdagsdebatt om EU:s militära roll’, Dagens Nyheter, 03.06.1999. 
31 A. Lindh, ‘Foreign Policy Declaration 1999’, 10.02.1999. 
32 Helsinki European Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, 10–11.12.1999, para 27. 
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leagues publicly for accepting an increasing militarisation of the EU33. Furthermore, 
the media published articles warning of a ‘common EU defence’ and an ‘EU army’, 
which pushed the government into a defensive stance34. 
 
Promoting the Civilian Dimension (1999–2001) 
Even though the Swedish government had succeeded in avoiding the development 
of a common defence in 1999, it was not reassured by the course of events the fol-
lowing year as the introduction of crisis management into the EU started with a 
heavy emphasis on its military dimension. The set-up of new crisis management insti-
tutions such as the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) 
tilted the balance clearly towards the military side35. In order to counter this devel-
opment, Sweden became very eager to emphasise the non-military aspects. It was 
also perceived as easier to sell the ESDP politically if it was not too military and thus 
not seen as calling into question the policy of military non-alignment36.  
However, there was also a genuine belief that the civilian instruments were lack-
ing if the ESDP was to be a serious tool for crisis management37. Sweden argued that 
a comprehensive security approach was needed and that by promoting the civilian 
aspects, the EU was a suitable actor since its strength lies in its ability to deploy both 
civilian and military instruments38. There were also questions as to whether the military 
aspects of the ESDP, which were being strongly pushed for in some quarters, were 
actually what was required – whether there was indeed a demand for purely military 
crisis management.  
Although Sweden had already pushed for the recognition of the civilian aspects 
of crisis management in Cologne, it now embarked on a campaign lobbying for 
conflict prevention, civilian crisis management (CCM) and the possibility of strength-
ening the United Nations’ (UN) role in peacekeeping. However, this was not a per-
ception shared by other member states at the time who questioned Sweden’s inten-
tions39. Indeed, Sweden’s vocal promotion of the civilian aspects met with rather stiff 
resistance and even animosity. Swedish officials even felt ridiculed by their col-
leagues, in particular those from member states that wanted to focus and devote 
their energy on developing the military dimension of the ESDP. As Sweden champi-
oned a civilian dimension of the ESDP, it was thus clear it was against headwind40.  
However, the Swedish attempts were eventually successful as its persistence led 
to the creation of a Civilian Crisis Management Committee in May 200041. The Swed-
ish EU Presidency in the first half of 2001 undoubtedly offered Sweden a unique op-
portunity to give a strong impetus to the CCM aspects. Sweden was particularly ac-
                                                 
33 D. Ljungberg, ’Thage G. Peterson får mothugg’, Dagens Nyheter, 08.06.1999. 
34 Interview #1. 
35 Ojanen, op.cit., p. 170. 
36 Interview #8. 
37 Interview #3. 
38 Interview #8. 
39 Interview #1. 
40 Jonson, op.cit.,p. 205. 
41 Council Decision, 2000/354/CFSP, 22.05.2000. 
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tive on these issues and there was a clear focus on the civilian dimension42. For ex-
ample, the Presidency drafted an action programme for conflict prevention that 
was adopted by the Göteborg European Council in June 200143. Sweden was also 
one of the member states initiating the Civilian Headline Goal 2008 (CHG 2008) in or-
der to match development on the military side. The so-called Civilian Response 
Teams (CRT), an idea borrowed from the EUBG concept and aimed at establishing a 
civilian rapid reaction capacity, was launched together with Germany44.  
 
 
3. Towards Unequivocal Enthusiasm 
 
Embracing the ESDP (2001–2003) 
Sweden’s initial hesitation towards the ESDP had therefore somewhat faded as the 
civilian dimension became more recognised and, with it, less need to defend its exis-
tence45. Holding the EU Presidency had led to a change in attitude not only in politi-
cal circles but the Swedish public had grown more positive towards the EU in gener-
al46. However, there was still a certain anxiety with regard to the military dimension of 
the ESDP which would finally be overcome in 200347. 
The shift in attitude first arose in response to the situation in Macedonia (FYROM) 
and Operation Concordia, considered a watershed. The Swedish Foreign Minister 
Anna Lindh had played an active role during the Swedish EU Presidency in negotiat-
ing the Ohrid peace agreement in FYROM48. This was very important since Lindh and 
Sweden had been in the driver’s seat and thus been able to observe the process 
from the start49. When the decision was taken in January 2003 to launch Concor-
dia50, the first military ESDP operation, it was a ‘Berlin plus’ arrangement and largely 
conform to expectations. However, there were several sensitive points for the Swed-
ish government such as the conformity with its policy of military non-alignment but 
also the EU’s independence of decision-making51.  
                                                
If Concordia started to reduce fear of the ESDP’s military dimension, Operation 
Artemis would definitely help eliminate it and this operation had major importance 
for Sweden’s relation to the ESDP. The decision to launch the operation in the DRC in 
June 200352 took place only a few months after the EU disagreement over the Iraq 
war and there was thus a wish among EU member states to show some clout53. Ar-
temis was unique in several ways: it was the first time the EU deployed troops out-of-
area, the first time based on a UN Chapter VII mandate and the first time without re-
 
42 Göteborg European Council, ‘Presidency Conclusions’, 15–16.06.2001, para. 47–54. 
43 Council of the European Union, ’EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts’, 15–16.06.2001. 
44 M. Strömvik, ‘Starting to think big’, in Bailes et al., op.cit., p. 210. 
45 Interview #11. 
46 Interview #3. 
47 Interview #9. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Interview #8. 
50 Council Joint Action, 2003/92/CFSP, 27.01.2003. 
51 Interview #9. 
52 Council Joint Action, 2003/423/CFSP, 05.06.2003. 
53 Interview #10. 
  10EU Diplomacy Papers 5/2008 
course to NATO assets54. While France was willing to launch the operation on its own, 
it was wary of it being perceived as neo-colonialism55. It was on a Swedish initiative 
that the EU started looking at options for an operation and talks between Sweden 
and France eventually led to the two being the only member states contributing 
combat troops to Artemis56.  
For Sweden, Artemis was, as one official put it, a ‘form of triple touchdown: it was 
the UN asking the EU for help, it was an autonomous operation and it was Africa’57. 
These three factors suited Swedish motives as well as Lindh’s profile perfectly and she 
thus pushed for Swedish participation strongly, even, according to some sources, 
against the Prime Minister’s wishes. For Lindh, it was central that it was on a direct re-
quest by the UN given the traditional emphasis placed on the UN in Swedish foreign 
and security policy58. Furthermore, Sweden had been cautious about the ‘Berlin plus’ 
arrangements and reluctant to let NATO, of which it was not a member, interfere or 
make decisions for the EU. Finally, it was Africa, traditionally a Swedish priority, and 
Lindh had not only visited the DRC a few weeks earlier but also been on the phone 
with the UN Secretary-General, who had warned against a repetition of Rwanda59. It 
should also not be forgotten that there was a parallel discussion in the Convention 
on the Future of Europe on common defence guarantees60. These factors contrib-
uted to Lindh seeking to influence the process and pushing the ESDP in a direction 
that she favoured61.  
Hence, there is general agreement that Artemis had far-reaching implications 
and that its effects should not be underestimated. Firstly, as it was widely perceived 
as a major success – the EU was said to have stopped a potential genocide – it re-
stored the EU’s self-confidence after the debacle over the Iraq war. However, it also 
had a contagious effect and lent Sweden greater influence not only within the ESDP 
but also in other CFSP-related areas62. Secondly, Artemis showed that being a mili-
tary non-aligned state does not mean fear of military engagement. In particular, due 
to its strong push for the civilian aspects, Sweden had been perceived as a country 
with an aversion to the military aspects63. Whether merited or not, this perception 
largely changed in 200364. Thirdly, Artemis also had effects on the Swedish Armed 
Forces (SAF), whose focus previously had been mainly on NATO’s Partnership for 
Peace (PfP). The SAF started seeing the value of the ESDP as it entailed being fully 
involved in the whole process including the decision-making65. Artemis would also 
influence the Swedish position on the EUBG66. Fourthly, Artemis moved France and 
                                                 
54 M. Strömvik, op.cit., p. 229.  
55 Interview #9. 
56 M. Strömvik, ‘Suède: Une ouverture croissante à l’action internationale’, in Patrice Buffotot (ed.), La Défense en 
Europe. Avancées et limites, Paris, La Documentation Française, 2005, p. 177.  
57 Interview #13. 
58 Interview #7. 
59 Interview #9.  
60 Interview #10. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Interview #9. 
63 Strömvik, op.cit., p. 211. 
64 Interview #3. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Interview #10. 
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Sweden closer to each other in the ESDP, whereas previously Sweden had more of-
ten ended up on the Anglo-Saxon side67.  
                                                
However, the main consequence of Artemis was that it led to a decisive change 
in attitude towards the ESDP and the military dimension. As one official said, ‘Artemis 
led to a change, and from that moment Anna started to love the ESDP and Sweden 
became one of the most ESDP-friendly countries’68. The ESDP became uncontrover-
sial and the cautious and hesitant approach eventually gave way to enthusiasm.  
 
Shifting into Higher Gear (2003–) 
The clearest symbol, however, of how Sweden’s view on the ESDP and in particular its 
military dimension had changed came with the Swedish support of the EUBG con-
cept proposed by France and the UK. Following Concordia and in particular Artemis, 
the ESDP project was seen in a more positive light69. Operation Artemis had also 
demonstrated to the Swedish government the importance of a European rapid re-
action capacity. In April 2004, Sweden declared, together with Finland, its intention 
to create an EUBG and assume responsibility as a Framework Nation70 and in No-
vember 2004 the NBG was presented71.  
On the Swedish side, this decision was motivated by both foreign policy and de-
fence policy motives72. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA), wishing that Sweden 
would be as active as possible in the ESDP, and considering it as an opportunity to 
support the UN favoured Swedish participation. However, this does not explain the 
Swedish decision to take the lead of a battle group and the MFA73. As one official 
said, ‘the decision [to lead a battle group] would never have come about if the De-
fence Ministry would not have wanted it’74. Firstly, it was an opportunity for the SAF to 
plan and lead a military unit of battalion size, unlikely to happen in the PfP75. It was 
therefore perceived that leading a EUBG would strongly contribute to developing 
the Swedish military capacity for taking part in international crisis management op-
erations76. Following Artemis, the SAF had become much more interested in the EU 
and indeed France had praised the Swedish contribution77.  
However, the main reason was that it coincided with the government’s efforts to 
transform the SAF from a territorial defence force to an intervention force78. The 
transformation of the SAF had been a difficult process and despite an objective to 
increase the number of troops deployable for international duty, it had never been 
accomplished79. No defence minister had managed to overcome the resistance 
within the SAF, and the reformist camp thus saw a unique window of opportunity in 
 
67 Interview #8. 
68 Interview #10. 
69 Interview #8. 
70 I. Hedström, ‘Sverige vill delta i stridsgrupp’, Dagens Nyheter, 06.04.2004. 
71 S. Bøe, ’Norge med i nordisk EU-styrka’, Dagens Nyheter, 23.11.2004. 
72 Interview #3. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Interview #10. 
75 Interview #3. 
76 Interview #4. 
77 T. Nandorf, ’Fransk järnvilja vill rusta EU’, Dagens Nyheter, 2.09.2004. 
78 Interviews #3, 4. 
79 Interview #10. 
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the EUBG to give a decisive push for defence reforms80. The Commander-in-Chief of 
the SAF, General Håkan Syrén, took on board the EUBG concept as well as the Euro-
pean Security Strategy (ESS)81. Even though the ESS is not a legally binding docu-
ment, it was used as a ‘smokescreen’, an imaginary constraint, by the Ministry of De-
fence to make politically difficult domestic reforms under the cover of EU preroga-
tive82.  
 
 
4. Activism and Europeanisation 
 
The Changing Character of Activism 
From this overview, it seems clear that there has been a development over time and 
that Sweden has made quite a significant journey in the ESDP. As one official said, 
‘we have moved quite remarkably [in the ESDP], from the initial ideas when we were 
concerned that it was only focusing on military aspects to pushing for the civilian di-
mension and more recently also the military one’83. Perhaps this journey is best per-
sonified in the former Foreign Minister Anna Lindh who went from initial suspicion of 
where the project would lead to realising the great potential of the instrument84.  
There had been concerns in the EU that the non-aligned member states Finland, 
Austria and Sweden would become problematic and ‘sources of nuisance power’ 
as Hanna Ojanen calls it, because their military non-alignment could hamper further 
development of an EU security and defence policy85. It was said that in the early 
years of the ESDP, Sweden would receive the ‘Maginot medal’ for its defensive be-
haviour since it always threw its weight behind wording that would halt any possible 
expansion of the ESDP86. Not a very glorious epithet to hold, concerns that Sweden 
would be isolated seem to have pushed its government to take a more pro-active 
stand on the ESDP. The civilian dimension became a means to shape and influence 
the ESDP in a way conducive to traditional Swedish foreign and security policy think-
ing. However, it also contributed to a greater openness, as one official noted: ‘we 
did not want to be perceived as anti-military or fearing the military aspects’87. This 
pushed Sweden to show in the eyes of the other member states that it was credible 
when it advocated its broader concept of security, encompassing both civilian and 
military instruments88. A second reason was that there was a lack of understanding of 
the ESDP from both administrative and political circles leading to an instinctive reac-
tion from Stockholm to hold back89. As one official stated, ‘we thought that it was 
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82 Interviews #9, 10, 13. 
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only about common defence and that the ESDP would equate to a common de-
fence’90.  
The domestic context should not be underestimated either. As a major shift in 
Sweden’s security policy was taking place, it took some time to gain widespread 
approval and support91. As time passed, the government adapted to it as well as the 
Riksdag and the two eurosceptic parties supporting the government. The more peo-
ple understood and saw that the ESDP worked, the more acceptable it became, the 
military dimension included92. There is also wide consensus that the experience of 
holding the EU Presidency had an impact as it forced Sweden to take responsibility 
for the EU and laid the ground for a more positive attitude amongst the public to-
wards the EU, including the ESDP93.  
 
The ESDP’s Impact on Swedish Security Policy 
As Reuben Wong writes, there is merit in making a distinction when speaking of 
change in foreign policy as to whether it regards procedures and structures or the 
actual substance of a policy area94. On a structural level, it is clear that the EU mem-
bership and the development of the CFSP and the ESDP have had a clear impact on 
all aspects of Swedish foreign and security policy. As one official stated: 
 
Holding the EU Presidency forced the whole government administration, 
from the lower levels to the highest level, to think in EU terms and to manage 
the acquis communautaire95. 
 
There was a learning process and the early years of membership were mainly de-
voted to ‘keeping Sweden’s head above the steadily rising EU water level’96. The 
scope and the scale of the changes required by membership somewhat struck 
Swedish government officials by surprise and it became quickly clear that the EU was 
not merely another international organisation97. It introduced a completely different 
way of working, very intense and above all time-consuming98. 
As regards policy on a macro level, the effects of the ESDP seem to be less 
marked as it is rather EU membership as such that has provoked changes in the 
Swedish security policy tradition. The policy of military non-alignment seems to have 
had little impact on the conduct of Swedish security policy with regard to the ESDP. 
As Swedish diplomats noted the term ‘military non-alignment’ is never used when 
discussing the ESDP, only in matters relating to the PfP. The only time military non-
alignment seems to have been brought up following the creation of the ESDP was in 
connection with the discussions in the Convention on the Future of Europe on mutual 
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defence guarantees99. However, on a micro level the change is more substantial, in 
particular as regards operations as one official notes: 
 
In the EU, we participate fully […] and we sit as a member around the table, 
we take part in the process of developing concepts and we take decisions. 
We are involved not just in the later stages. This has had an enormous im-
pact100.   
 
The fact that in the ESDP, the member states are involved from beginning to end, 
from idea to implementation, seems to be key. This aspect is particularly important as 
Sweden’s activism in the early years also was driven by a fear that it would not be 
considered on an equal footing with the NATO members in the ESDP101. The impact 
of EU membership in this regard cannot be underestimated102.  
Perhaps the clearest example of the ESDP’s impact on Swedish security policy is in 
the area of defence reform. It is clear that the transformation of the SAF is largely tak-
ing place as a result of the development of the ESDP. According to a Swedish officer, 
the change is the ‘biggest in the history of the SAF for the last 500 years’103. The 
commitments made to ESDP operations have been used as a tool by the Swedish 
government for introducing controversial national defence reforms104. The transfor-
mation of the SAF was, if not brought about, then at least accelerated by the devel-
opment of the ESDP and in particular the NBG105. The ESDP process has thus served 
as an important vehicle for reforms, or as one official described it, as a ‘transforma-
tor’106. 
From this overview, it is possible to say that at least three of Reuben Wong’s indi-
cators for adaptation and policy convergence, set out in Table 1 above, can be 
found (although less so the one on common policy outputs taking priority over na-
tional domaines réservés).  Firstly, there has been a growing salience to the European 
political agenda as Sweden has embraced the ESDP. Secondly, there has been an 
adherence to common objectives as Sweden first reluctantly recognised in the late 
1990s. Thirdly, there has been an internalisation of EU norms and policy in terms of 
both procedure and content. This may hint at a relatively strong degree of the first 
aspect of Europeanisation and Hanna Ojanen has even argued that Swedish foreign 
policy today is more the EU’s than its own107. However, this may be an exaggeration. 
Europeanisation is not such a unidirectional and clear-cut process as Sweden has 
also been active in shaping the ESDP. 
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Sweden’s Impact on the ESDP 
From the overview above, it is also clear that Sweden has had a rather substantial 
influence on the development of the ESDP. This points to an interwoven process as it 
is a question not only of the ESDP influencing Sweden, but also of Sweden influencing 
the ESDP. It has participated actively in shaping the process and influencing other 
member states. Sweden rather quickly saw that the ESDP was a dynamic framework 
that was relatively flexible and possible to influence, much simpler than, for example, 
the UN108.  
As has been noted above, Sweden is one of few EU member states that has con-
tributed with personnel to all the military and civilian ESDP operations launched to 
date. Though figures need to be verified, some internal calculations by the MFA sug-
gest that Sweden has contributed 10 per cent of all civilian personnel in ESDP opera-
tions making it the fourth biggest troop contributor109.  
In terms of conceptual contributions, it is clear that Sweden has played a leading 
role in the development of the civilian dimension. As one official put it, the ‘fact that 
there is a civilian dimension of the ESDP today is almost a Swedish accomplish-
ment’110. While Sweden considered it crucial for the success of the ESDP that there 
would be both a military and a civilian dimension, there was, as we have seen 
above, a strong degree of incomprehension from the other member states fearing 
that it would dilute the military dimension111. However, it is a very different situation 
today as the comprehensive security approach and the broad range of civilian and 
military instruments of the EU is touted in most keynote speeches. Furthermore, of the 
twenty ESDP operations launched so far only five have been military. Although most 
civilian operations have been rather small, it nevertheless shows that Sweden and 
other like-minded member states had been correct112. Swedish diplomats thus take a 
certain pride, perhaps not wrongly so, in having succeeded in ensuring both a civil-
ian and military approach in the ESDP113.  
It has been highlighted above how the ESDP and the process associated with the 
NBG have contributed to a more rapid transformation of the SAF. However, the NBG 
has also worked the other way round as it has made Sweden more proactive on the 
military side114. In implementing the EUBG concept meant that Sweden could play a 
very active role and contribute to the discussions at the EU level115.  
Sweden has thus exerted quite a substantial influence on the ESDP given its size. 
As one official said, ‘Sweden is recognised, it is a great power within the CFSP’116. A 
recent study by Daniel Naurin seems to confirm this as Sweden is ranked the fourth 
most sought-after member state (after Germany, the UK and France) in the CFSP and 
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that its scores are higher in foreign policy than in economic and agricultural policy117. 
This seems to defy previous research on Europeanisation where only the larger mem-
ber states are said to be powerful enough to fashion the structures and influence the 
EU policies according to their interests, in particular in areas of ‘high politics’118. This is 
particularly interesting in light of what was mentioned above regarding the chal-
lenges that member states face with regard to the CFSP policy-making process. In-
deed, for several smaller member states, the capacity to launch initiatives is ham-
pered in the CFSP by the limited resources of their ministries. However, the case of 
Sweden proves that if you are a player ready to contribute with ideas to the policy 
process and with personnel to operations, you can wield an influence much beyond 
your size.  
In terms of the second aspect of Europeanisation, national projection, we can 
therefore find a rather strong presence of more or less all four indicators. Firstly, Swe-
den has attempted to increase its national influence in the world through the ESDP 
such as in the case of Artemis. Secondly, it has attempted to influence the policies of 
other member states by being one of the most active member states in the ESDP, 
pushing the development of its crisis management capacity. Thirdly, it has used the 
EU as a cover as we have seen with regard to defence reforms. Fourthly, it has exter-
nalised its national foreign policy positions onto the EU level by pressing for issues that 
fitted well with traditional Swedish security policy such as conflict prevention, civilian-
military cooperation and EU-UN relations. It therefore seems clear that Sweden has 
made its mark on the ESDP, emphasising a bi-directional process of Europeanisation.  
 
 
5. Explaining Swedish Activism in the ESDP 
 
The EU as a Foreign Policy Platform 
From the attempts in the late 1990s when the focus was to stop all progress towards a 
common defence, Sweden today embraces the ESDP. The conclusion that such an 
attitude change to the ESDP, and in particular its military dimension, has taken place 
raises the question why this took place. Some indications have already been given, 
but there are also some broader underpinning reasons. A general reason explaining 
Swedish activism in the ESDP was a generally positive attitude towards the CFSP and 
belief in the EU as an actor on the international stage, including in terms of security 
policy119. The experience of the EU presidency in this regard was very important in 
recognising the EU as a global actor120. In the political discourse, this is also possible 
to observe from the declarations and speeches, with Foreign Minister Carl Bildt em-
phasising the special position of the EU in Swedish foreign and security policy121.  
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However, one should note that Sweden also has a long tradition of pursuing an 
active and independent foreign policy with a strong self-confidence and vision, be-
lieving that a smaller state can make a difference. Furthermore, Sweden has a long 
tradition of participation in international peacekeeping operations, both in the 
framework of the UN and NATO122. This tradition has facilitated Swedish participation 
in ESDP operations, as there were no taboos with regard to sending military troops 
abroad. The experiences of taking part in first UN-led, then NATO-led operations in 
the Balkans, also contributed to an awareness that the UN was not well-equipped to 
handle the new types of complex threats such as those in the Balkans123. This led 
Sweden to become genuinely interested in strengthening the EU’s crisis manage-
ment capabilities. Furthermore, whereas peacekeeping enjoyed considerable public 
support, the EU itself was less warmly appreciated. As such, participation in the ESDP 
was also a way of influencing domestic opinion and showcasing the EU as a project 
for peace. With its tradition of an active foreign policy, but recognising that as an EU 
member it was no longer possible to act in the way it once had, Sweden thus 
needed to find a new approach.  
Even though perhaps reluctantly in the first years, Sweden thus came to recog-
nise that the EU offered the best way to channel Swedish foreign policy124. As a 
smaller country with international dependence, it was probably easier to accept in-
ternational co-operation125. For Sweden, the CFSP and the ESDP thus presented an 
opportunity as a new platform for continuing to pursue an active foreign and security 
policy126. However, it also pushed Sweden to become more active as it realised the 
possibility to influence the EU’s broader agenda for international peace and security.  
 
Realising the Potential of the ESDP 
It may at first sight seem a paradox that Sweden has taken such an active part and 
promoted an area which strikes at the core of national sovereignty. On the other 
hand, the Swedish government has been careful in stressing the intergovernmental 
basis of the ESDP, rejecting the use of qualified majority voting. As one official said, 
the intergovernmental structure of the ESDP has been an ‘indispensable condition’ 
and Sweden has been able to be active in the ESDP because it has been intergov-
ernmental127. The fact that the ESDP has been in the hands of the member states 
have given them a sense of retaining control of its development, particularly impor-
tant in the case of a Sweden keen not to see any progress towards a common de-
fence. Furthermore, it has created a strong sense of ownership128. 
Another important explanation for the Swedish appreciation of the ESDP has 
been that it proved to be an efficient instrument in terms of both resources and re-
sults129. As one official noted, it is a ‘cheap form of foreign policy’130. The CFSP 
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budget covers all civilian ESDP costs, except for salaries for the personnel, which 
Sweden is funding out of the development aid budget131. For a small member state, 
there is thus a clear added value as it would cost more to act alone. Furthermore, 
Sweden saw that the ESDP functioned well and that its operations delivered results132. 
Finally, the development of the ESDP was in line with Swedish views of a wider con-
cept of security133. The combination of different instruments suited Sweden well and 
as the civilian dimension grew to become the dominant one, thus rewarding a hard-
fought struggle, it gave further encouragement134. This made the ESDP a very attrac-
tive option for Sweden.  
ts size.  
                                                
 
 
6. Conclusion: Bi-Directional Europeanisation 
 
The aim of this paper has been to examine the role Sweden has played in the ESDP 
and why it has become so active in this policy area, including how and to what ex-
tent the ESDP has influenced Sweden and vice versa.  
There has been an adaptation of Swedish security policy due not only to EU 
membership itself, but also the pressures arising from the development of the ESDP. 
Sweden has had to reform and to reshape its security policy as a result of EU mem-
bership. However, Sweden has also played an active role in the ESDP and tried to 
bring its own foreign policy orientations to bear on its development. At the outset, 
Sweden was firmly against the development of the EU into a military actor. However, 
as Sweden concluded in the late 1990s that it was not possible to stop the establish-
ment of the ESDP, the second best option was to ensure that it reflected Swedish pri-
orities such as CCM and conflict prevention135. This meant to be active in the policy 
process and contribute. Taking part in missions, including military ones, follows the 
same logic of showing commitment and thus influencing the direction. There is also a 
more psychological phenomenon linked to this. As the former chairperson of the Par-
liamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs put it, if the EU needs troops, the ‘question is 
posed to all around the table: the country that does not raise its hand will count as a 
lightweight – even in other political issues’136. This example highlights the bi-
directional nature of Europeanisation; in one way, it shows the peer pressure that is 
put on member states in the EU context, and in another, it shows how to gain influ-
ence in the ESDP by playing a pro-active role and obtaining an influence going be-
yond i
The Swedish activism in the field of the ESDP also highlights the question of part-
ners and relations with other actors in the ESDP. In this regard, Sweden seems to have 
been careful of maintaining good relations to both France and the UK, the two main 
players in the ESDP and the ones with perhaps the most opposite views on the finalité 
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of the ESDP137. In the debate between what scholars refer to as ‘Europeanists’ and 
‘Atlanticists’, Sweden seems to have exploited the gap existing in the ESDP between 
France and the UK by supporting both a stronger EU crisis management capacity 
and a stronger transatlantic link138. Sweden has thus gained a certain room for ma-
noeuvre by not belonging to any of the extreme sides of the spectrum and by play-
ing the pivotal role as a ‘third state’139.  
The results clearly show that in the case of Sweden and the ESDP, Europeanisation 
has been a bi-directional process. A study on the consequences of EU membership 
prepared by two retired Swedish diplomats in 1994, stresses the potentially sweeping 
changes for Sweden’s security policy, but at the same time underlines that the EU 
would also help promote Swedish security interests: 
 
No one should be mistaken that EU membership will bring about far-reaching 
obligations of a character that Sweden hitherto has not needed to consider 
or undertake. But no one should either believe that Sweden hereby aban-
dons the control over its foreign policy. What is at stake is to assemble the 
European states to collective action through the promotion of common val-
ues and interests140. 
 
Fourteen years later, this assessment seems to hold even though neither the ESDP nor 
the concept of Europeanisation existed at the time.  
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